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LOCKHART V. MCCREE" THE "BIASED BUT UNBIASED




One of the issues that has lingered in capital cases is the confusing
problem of determining when the state may remove, for cause, a venire
member who opposes the death penalty. In 1968, the Supreme Court in
Witherspoon v. Illinois' held that a state could not challenge for cause a
potential juror who expressed opposition to the death penalty, as long
as the juror did not absolutely exclude assessing it. The Court reasoned
that the jury was the conscience of the community and that the defend-
ant was entitled to have a pool of potential jurors that included individu-
als who had reservations about the appropriateness of the death penalty
in general, as did a substantial portion of the American population at the
time.2 The Court recognized that the state could challenge, for cause,
those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment would prevent
them from impartially determining guilt or innocence. The state could
also exclude jurors who would automatically reject death as a possible
punishment from the sentencing trial.
3
Witherspoon left open, however, the question whether the state could
constitutionally remove this latter category ofjurors from the guilt-inno-
cence trial if they claimed they were capable of judging guilt or inno-
cence fairly. The Court determined that the record in Witherspoon did
not support holding such an exclusion unconstitutional. In a footnote,
the Court expressly reserved the question in the event of a case with
more compelling evidence of a constitutional violation.
4
The Court's holding prompted numerous attacks upon capital trial
procedures that did not permit this category of Witherspoon excludables
to serve on guilt-innocence juries. 5 The challengers reasoned that these
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. A.B. 1968, University of Califor-
nia, Davis; J.D. 1974, University of Houston,
1. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
2. Id. at 520. According to the Court in Witherspoon, public opinion surveys showed
that in 1960, 51% of the American people supported capital punishment, whereas in 1966,
only 42% supported it. During this same time period, opposition to capital punishment
increased from 36% of the American population to 47%. Id. at 520 n.16. More recent
public opinion surveys conducted in 1982, however, determined that approximately 70%
of all Americans supported capital punishment, indicating a reversal of the trend noted in
Vitherspoon. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1982
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (1983).
3. lVitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522-23 n.21.
4. Id. at 517-18, 520 n.18.
5. E.g., Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129 (4th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573
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venire members would be nullifiers only at the sentencing trial, and, if
they claimed an ability to decide fairly in the guilt-innocence trial, their
exclusion at that stage would deprive the defendant of a constitutionally
composed jury.6 Such a juror would literally be both biased and unbi-
ased. Opposition to capital punishment would be so substantial as to
exclude even the possibility of its imposition, yet such a juror would be
able to set that opposition aside so. completely that it would not influ-
ence the decision of guilt or innocence. If this reasoning were accepted,
every conviction and sentence resulting after the exclusion of such a
juror from the guilt-innocence stage of a capital case would be
unconstitutional.
Since no state required the seating of these "biased but unbiased"
jurors in capital cases, this argument could have had dramatic results. It
might have reversed the results of hundreds of capital trials, 7 as well as
abolishing the unitary jury system in future death penalty cases. In more
concrete terms, it could have emptied death rows in most states across
the nation and vacated the convictions in society's most heinous murder
cases adjudicated over most of the preceding generation.
Every appellate court but one, however, rejected the argument. 8
(5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882
(1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979); United States ex rel Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1064 (1977).
6. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 131-32; Smith, 660 F.2d at 575; see also Winick, Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 57 (1982).
7. This holding might have reversed convictions, not merely sentences, if applied
retroactively. For a discussion of this consideration, see Woodard v. Sargent, 753 F.2d
694 (8th Cir. 1985). There were 37 states that provided for capital punishment at the time
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.Ct. 1759 (1986) was decided. Of those 37 states, 33 allowed for
sentencing by juries alone or permitted juries to act in an advisory role. See ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-47 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3
(West Supp. 1985); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-
46a (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 532.025 (1983); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1984); MD. CRIM. LAW
CODE ANN. § 413 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1985); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.030 (Supp. 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.552 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
(Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002 (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1983);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.10 (1983); 1985 OR. LAWS ch. 3; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711
(1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 23A-27A-4 (1979) TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203 (1982); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
art. 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1985); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 2303(c) (Supp. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (1983); WASH. REV.
CODE § 10-95.080 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 6-4-102 (1977 and Supp. 1982). As of Oc-
tober 1, 1985, these thirty-three states had custody of 1395 of the 1590 persons on death
row. See, Death Row U.S.A. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (Oct. 1, 1985). It is
difficult to determine with any precision how many of these convictions would have been
reversed if the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Woodard were adopted by the Court. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that exclusion of only one prospective juror in violation
of IVitherspoon is sufficient to require retrial of the defendant in a capital case, so the
number of potential reversals was likely to be significant. See Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S.
122 (1976).
8. See cases cited supra note 5.
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The exception was the Eighth Circuit, in Grigsby v. Mabry.9 Relying upon
sociological studies that purported to show conviction-proneness in cap-
ital juries, the Grisby court disappointed prosecutors, who feared the ret-
roactive results of the decision as much as its future implications. The
decision simultaneously gave systematic effect to the arguments of death
penalty 'opponents who claimed that capital punishment was unjustly
imposed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grigsby to resolve the issue
of the "biased but unbiased" juror. It ultimately reversed the Eighth
Circuit's decision in Lockhart v. McCree.' 0 Almost two decades after the
famous footnote that had left the question open, I I the Court squarely
held that the Witherspoon reasoning could not be extended to prohibit a
state from excluding from the guilt-innocence trial, as well as from the
sentencing trial, those venire members who could not consider the sen-
tence of death.
This article examines Lockhart v.McCree in light of the controlling
constitutional and policy issues, some of which were presented to the
Court but not incorporated into its reasoning. The article begins by ex-
ploring the line of cases which set general standards for the exclusion of
venire members opposed to capital punishment.1 2 Then, in Part II, the
article discusses the Eighth Circuit's opinion in McCree as well as the
Supreme Court's reasons for reversal.' 3 Next, in Part III the article ex-
amines the issues underlying the Supreme Court's holding. 14 This Part
first considers the disadvantages to both the state and the accused which
would have resulted from the Eighth Circuit's abolition of the unitary
jury, but which that court did not credit. 1 5 It further evaluates the ex-
tent to which "biased but unbiased" venire members can be identified
reliably.' 6 Part III also considers whether the sixth and fourteenth
amendments can be read to prohibit unitary juries in capital cases, and it
examines the Eighth Circuit's use of sociological evidence, which the
Supreme Court rejected as a basis for deciding the constitutional ques-
tions.' 7 Finally, Part IV states the author's conclusions, which are that
McCree was properly decided and that the Supreme Court is moving to-
ward a more workable, balanced approach to constitutional issues in
9. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S.
Ct. 1758 (1986). McCree's case had been consolidated by stipulation with two other
habeas corpus petitions by James Grigsby and DeWayne Hulsey. Grigsby's case became
moot in 1983, after he died in prison. The district court determined that Hulsey's case was
procedurally barred because he had failed to preserve his allegations of error by objection
under the doctrine of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569
F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
10. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
11. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
12. See infra notes 19-53 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 91-211 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 147-211 and accompanying text.
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capital cases. 18
The author was counsel of record in the Supreme Court for sixteen
states in Lockhart v. McCree, and argued to the Court that the states could
properly exclude the potential jurors at issue. Consequently, this article
is not an attempt to analyze the issues from a position of impartiality, if
indeed that claim can ever be made in an article on this volatile subject.
However, the article does present arguments that were not fully devel-
oped in the Supreme Court's opinion, and for this reason, it may con-
tribute to an understanding of the states' position and perhaps some of
the Court's reasoning.
I. CAPITAL JURY QUALIFICATION UNDER WITHERSPOON,
ABRAMS AND WITT
Prior to 1968, the Supreme Court routinely refused to impose re-
strictions on the states' power to enact discretionary death penalty stat-
utes. 19 Witherspoon v. Illinois2° marked the beginning of the Court's
efforts to establish "unique safeguards" for capital defendants by impos-
ing a more stringent standard of due process in such cases. 2 ' In Wither-
spoon, the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute permitting the
prosecution to exclude jurors who had "conscientious scruples against
capital punishment, or . . . [who were] opposed to [the] same.''22
At Witherspoon's trial, the prosecution was able to use this statute
to challenge nearly half of the venire for cause on the basis that they had
general hesitation about returning the death penalty. The state made
these challenges without inquiring whether the potential jurors could
impartially determine guilt or consider death as a possible punish-
18. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
19. By 1962, all American jurisdictions adopting capital punishment statutes permit-
ted the fact-finder unfettered discretion in determining whether to assess death, life, or a
number of years in prison, once the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210 commentary at 120-132 (1980). Discretionary statutes of this
nature were not seriously challenged on constitutional grounds until after 1950. S. KAD-
ISH, S. SCHULHOFER, M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 518 (4th ed. 1983).
These court challenges were based upon alleged violations of three different constitutional
theories, that of equal protection, procedural due process, and cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. The equal protection argument focused upon the disproportionate number of
blacks sentenced to die for committing crimes against white victims. This argument was
initially rejected by the Court in Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262 (1970). It was reconsid-
ered by the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (1987).
The procedural due process argument, which is based upon the contention that unfet-
tered jury discretion in sentencing violates the 14th amendment, was rejected in Mc-
Gautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207 (1971). The same basic argument was recast as an
eighth amendment argument in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and was one of
the bases for the Court's reversal. Id. at 222 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J., concurring).
20. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
21. It has been argued that the death penalty is qualitatively different from other crim-
inal penalties because it is irrevocable. For this reason, state and federal courts have im-
posed procedural safeguards that apply only in capital cases to ensure that the correct
decision is being made. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (Stewart, J., plu-
rality opinion); see also W. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPI-
TAL CASES (1984).




ment.23 The Court, impressed by the large number of jurors excluded
by the statute and the substantial number of Americans in the general
population echoing the concerns of the excluded venire members,
24
concluded that the Illinois procedure produced a "jury uncommonly
willing to condemn a man to die."'2 5 The remaining jurors could not
hope to speak for the community: "Culled of all who harbor doubts
about the wisdom of capital punishment - of all who would be reluctant
to pronounce the extreme penalty - such a jury can speak only for a
distinct and dwindling minority."' 26 The Court reasoned that the discre-
tion given to Illinois jurors in deciding whether to assess life or death
made it of particular importance that the decision be reached by a jury
selected from a fair cross-section of the community, including not only
those who believed strongly that death was an appropriate sentence, but
also those who had substantial reservations about capital punishment.
By indiscriminately excluding the latter category of potential jurors, the
state had violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
27
Witherspoon recognized that the state could constitutionally enforce
qualifications for a capitaljury. The state could only sustain a challenge
for cause, however, in two instances: first, against venire members who
could never return a verdict of death in any case, and second, against
those who could not impartially view the evidence in determining guilt
in a capital case. 28 The Court rejected as premature the contention that
a "biased but unbiased" juror, that is, one who would automatically vote
against capital punishment but who claimed to be impartial in determin-
ing guilt or innocence in a capital case, should be allowed as a constitu-
tional matter to judge guilt alone. Witherspoon contended that
preventing such jurors from determining guilt or innocence resulted in
a jury more likely to convict. The Court declined to adopt this argument
because the petitioner presented only three sociological studies sup-
porting this conclusion, which the Court considered too "fragmentary"
23. Forty-seven venire members were challenged by the prosecution in W1itherspoon in
"rapid succession," according to the Court, on the basis that they voiced general opposi-
tion to the death penalty. Thirty-nine of those members were excused without any inquiry
into whether they could consider assessing capital punishment in an appropriate case. Id.
at 514-15.
24. But see supra note 2.
25. HWitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 521. The Court supports this conclusion by observing
that an amici in the case, the American Friends Service Committee, et al., had argued that
the number of death row inmates was rising but the number of actual executions was de-
clining. These observations led the amici to conclude that there was a widening diver-
gence between capital juries, as they were constituted at the time, and society in general,
making it imperative to reconstitute capital juries to reflect society's views. Id. at 521 n. 19.
While this might be a reasonable deduction, it is also possible that an increase in the
number of court challenges beginning in the 1960's could account for this phenomenon as
individual cases tediously worked their way through the habeas corpus process. See supra
note 13.
26. iVitherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520.
27. Id. at 518.
28. The Court indicated that in order to be disqualified, the prospective juror must
make his views on these two issues "unmistakenly clear." Id. at 522 n.21. But see Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (a juror cannot be excluded under 1'itherspoon unless his
views "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties").
1988]
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and "tentative" as evidence. 29 It hinted, however, that if future petition-
ers could provide more convincing evidence supporting the claim of
conviction-proneness, it might be willing to extend its Witherspoon logic
to require that jurors excluded on sentence, but unbiased on guilt, be
eligible to sit during the guilt phase of a capital trial. The Court sug-
gested that such a holding might require states using sentencing juries
to provide two differently composed juries in every capital case, "using
one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment.
' 30
Subsequent to Witherspoon, the Court decided another related but
distinct issue involving capital jury sentencing which was to have a subtle
effect on the interpretation of Witherspoon standards. In Furman v. Geor-
gia, the Court concluded that existing death penalty schemes, which per-
mitted juries to use unstructured discretion in sentencing, violated the
Constitution. 3 1 Furman did not suggest how a constitutional death pen-
alty statute could be constructed. Furman itself contained nine separate
opinions giving nine different analyses of the constitutional issues. 3 2 In
attempting to comply with the Court's confusing messages about jury
discretion, some states, such as North Carolina, enacted mandatory
schemes where death was automatic once a defendant was found guilty
of a capital offense. 3 3 The North Carolina statute was eventually held
unconstitutional because it failed to permit ajury to consider mitigating
circumstances.3 4 Other states enacted "aggravating-mitigating" pat-
terns, where juries or judges were instructed to focus on whether certain
specifically defined facts had been established by the evidence before
assessing punishment.
3 5
The case of Adams v. Texas3 6 arose from one of these new statutes.
The Texas legislature, in an attempt to address the concerns of the
Court in Furman, provided for a bifurcated trial with separate hearings
29. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517 n.10. These studies were again before the Court in
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (1986).
30. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18.
31. 408 U.S 238 (1972).
32. Id. The Court's holding was stated in a brief per curiam opinion and contained no
central analysis.
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
34. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Accord Roberts v. Louisiana,
431 U.S. 633 (1976).
35. In Florida, for example, the post-Furman capital punishment statute required the
judge to instruct the jury to determine a capital defendant's sentence by balancing eight
specifically enumerated aggravating factors and seven specifically enumerated mitigating
factors. Examples of aggravating factors included the defendant committing more than
one murder at the same time or committing the murder while in the course of committing
certain felonies. Examples of mitigating factors included the defendant having no prior
criminal history or committing the crime while under the influence of an extreme emo-
tional or mental disturbance. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921-141 (West 1985). In Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), the Court determined that this aggravating-mitigating approach
properly focused the jury's inquiry so as to avoid unconstitutional jury discretion in sen-
tencing. In a companion case, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Court flatly
rejected the argument that a state was prohibited from enacting any capital punishment
statute no matter how carefully drawn.
36. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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by the same jury as to guilt-innocence and punishment. 3 7 In the sen-
tencing hearing, the jury decided three fact questions. 3 8 Only positiye,
unanimous answers to all three would result in the judge pronouncing a
sentence of death. 39 Texas also had a provision in its Penal Code that
stated: "A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror
unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or im-
prisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of
fact." '40 The Supreme Court held this statute unconstitutional in Adams
on the ground that it violated the limits on jury exclusion set forth in
Witherspoon.
To reach this conclusion, the Adams Court first rejected Texas' con-
tention that Witherspoon concerns did not apply, noting that the new
Texas death penalty statutes imposed limits on jury discretion in sen-
tencing by focusing on three key sentencing factors, unlike the Illinois
statute at issue in Witherspoon.4 ' The Court reasoned that even if Texas
jurors were not directly deciding the defendant's punishment, they were
told in advance the effect of their answers to the three sentencing ques-
tions at trial. The Court determined that the Texas provision at issue
violated the constitutional requirements of Witherspoon because it not
only excluded potential jurors who refused to follow the law, but it also
excluded those who might have been able to follow the law but would
have weighed their duties as jurors more seriously.
42
In Adams, however, the Court appeared to retreat from the absolute
standard of exclusion set forth in Witherspoon. Rather than require a
state to demonstrate conclusively that a prospective juror could never
assess death or sit impartially to decide guilt, the Court indicated in dic-
tum that a state could exclude venire members whose "views would pre-
vent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [jurors]
in accordance with [their] instructions and [their] oath."'4 3 By hinting at
a "substantial impairment" test, the Court was tentatively moving in a
new direction permitting states to exclude for cause jurors who were less
than adamant about their opposition to capital punishment but whose
capacity to be fair was impaired by their beliefs. 44 Whether this redefini-
37. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 3 7 .0 7 1(a) (Vernon Supp. 1979).
38. The three questions posed to a Texas capital jury on sentencing were:
(l)whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of
the deceased or another would result;
(2)whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3)if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
Id. at art. 37.071(b).
39. Id.
40. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(b) (Vernon 1974).
41. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 (1968).
42. Adams, 488 U.S. at 49-50.
43. Id. at 45.
44. Prior to Adams, one of the first signals that indicated the Court was moving away
from applying the stringent standards of Witherspoon came in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
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tion was inadvertent, as dictum sometimes tends to be, or an intentional
nod toward the concerns of the dissent,4 5 was difficult to determine
from the opinion. Furthermore, the Court did not address the more
practical problem of how courts or attorneys were to make this distinc-
tion from the long and often confused ramblings of prospective
jurors.
4 6
The Adams "substantial impairment" dictum, however, resurfaced in
Wainwright v. Wilt 4 7 as the definitive test for Witherspoon exclusions. The
issue in Witt was whether a prospective juror, who stated during voir
dire questioning in a capital case that her beliefs against capital punish-
ment would "interfere" with her judging the guilt or innocence of the
defendant, could be challenged for cause consistently with Witherspoon.4 s
Witt argued that such a statement fell short of the Witherspoon require-
ment that potential jurors unmistakably demonstrate that they would au-
tomatically vote against the death penalty in all circumstances before the
state could remove them for cause. In rejecting this argument, the
Court recognized that the Witherspoon test for excluding jurors had been
simplified in Adams. 4 9 After Furman, states had enacted death penalty
statutes that limited jury discretion in sentencing, and the Court rea-
soned that trials of death penalty cases were now similar to other crimi-
nal trials in which the jury's mission was to act as a fact-finder. 50 The
liberalization of the Witherspoon test was appropriate, said the Court, be-
cause the state as well as the defense was entitled to a jury that was fair
and impartial in making these factual decisions. 5 1 Additionally, the
Court concluded that a requirement of "unmistakable clarity" in the
showing that a Witherspoon excludable was properly challenged for cause
was impractical given the nature of voir dire examinations in capital
cases where many jurors equivocate, fail to articulate their true feelings,
(1978) where the Court declined to apply the "automatic" language of Witherspoon. In-
stead the Court held that exclusion by the state of certain prospective capital jurors was
proper because the jurors had made it unmistakably clear they could not follow the law in
the case regardless of whether they would automatically vote against imposing death. Id.
at 596. See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419 (1985). Thus, in retrospect, the
"substantial impairment" language of Adams should not have been totally unexpected.
45. Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Adams argued that as a result of Furman, "the condi-
tions that formed the predicate for Witherspoon no longer exist," and that "the Court
should be reexamining the doctrinal underpinnings of Witherspoon ... 448 U.S. at 52-
53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
48. Id. at 415-16.
49. The test had been simplified in the sense that the "tests with respect to sentencing
and guilt, originally in two prongs [in Witherspoon] have been merged .. " It had been
liberalized in the sense that it had gone from requiring that a juror state he would auto-
matically be opposed to the death penalty in Witherspoon to determining whether he was
"substantially impaired" in the performance of his duties as a juror as a result of his views
on capital punishment before he could be excused for cause. Id. at 421.
50. Id. at 422. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. Witt, 469 U.S. at 423. The Court supported its conclusion by noting that the
Witherspoon decision was based upon sixth amendment principles requiring a fair and im-
partial juror, not upon an eighth amendment cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
Under the sixth amendment, the Court reasoned that no defendant in any criminal case,
capital or otherwise, is entitled to seat jurors who are biased in his favor. Id.
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or hide them. 52 Finally, the Court determined that trial judges' rulings
on Witherspoon challenges of equivocating venire members should be
treated as findings of fact and afforded a presumption of correctness, as
are state court fact findings generally in habeas corpus review.
53
Witt signaled that the Court was shifting its view of death penalty
cases in general and of capital jury selection specifically. Witherspoon's
emphasis was on a death penalty defendant's right to a jury that was
more likely to acquit or sentence leniently because of residual doubts
about the penalty to be imposed. Witt's emphasis was on the state's
right, as well as the defendant's, to have jurors who could fairly and
impartially apply the law. In all likelihood, this shift in attitude was due
to the Court's belief that state death penalty statutes, subsequent to
Furman, adequately channeled a jury's sentencing decision, thus reduc-
ing the need for stringent restrictions on state challenges for cause.
II. LOCKHART V MCCREE: "THE BIASED BurT UNBIASED JUROR"
A. The Eighth Circuit's Reliance on Statistics About Attitudes
On February 14, 1978, Ardia McCree robbed and killed the owner
of a gift shop and service station in Camden, Arkansas. His defense at
trial was alibi. He claimed that a "tall, black stranger" hitched a ride
with him, used his rifle to commit the crime, and later asked to be left off
on a nearby dirt road. Two state eyewitnesses testified that McCree was
alone immediately after the murder until the time the "stranger" was
supposed to have left the car. Ballistic reports determined that Mc-
Cree's rifle, which had been left by the side of the road, had fired the
fatal shot. The jury disbelieved McCree's testimony, convicted him of
capital murder, but assessed his punishment at life imprisonment with-
out possibility of parole - a reaction that is not unusual in cases in
which proof of guilt is beyond reasonable doubt but is short of
ironclad.
54
At trial, the judge had excluded for cause eight prospective jurors
who stated they could not assess the death penalty under any circum-
stances. The jurors had not been asked nor had they volunteered
whether they could put aside their strongly-held beliefs and follow the
law in determining McCree's guilt.55 Arkansas law required that a uni-
tary jury both decide guilt and assess sentence. 56 Consequently, this
52. The Court observed that:
This is because determinations ofjuror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-
answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What com-
mon sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply
cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been
made 'unmistakably clear.'
Id. at 424-25.
53. Id. at 426.
54. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1761 (1986). See infra note 98 and accompa-
nying text.
55. 106 S. Ct. at 1761.
56. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301(3) (1977); Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 395, 659
S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 988 (1984).
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inquiry would have been immaterial.
McCree could not claim that the jury was biased against him in as-
sessing punishment, since it chose the lesser of the two possible
sentences. He argued, however, that by excluding from the guilt-inno-
cence trial the eight venire members who could not consider capital
punishment, without inquiring into whether they could fairly determine
his guilt, the state had violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights to a fair and impartial jury in the trial on guilt or innocence.
5 7
This claim brought him squarely within the unanswered question posed
by Witherspoon, concerning whether these jurors "biased on sentence,
but unbiased on guilt" could constitutionally be excluded from deter-
mining guilt or innocence.
At a subsequent habeas corpus hearing, McCree presented conclu-
sions from fifteen social science studies concerning the attitudes and be-
liefs of Witherspoon excludables. 58 These studies convinced the district
court that preventing "biased but unbiased" Witherspoon excludables
from sitting at the guilt portion of the trial resulted in a jury more prone
to convict capital defendants. The district court vacated both McCree's
conviction and his sentence, concluding that they were obtained in viola-
tion of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 59
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
57. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
58. The court categorized the following studies as "attitudinal and demographic"
surveys: Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-QualifiedJury:
An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1 (1970) [hereinafter Bronson
I]; Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to
Convict: Some Evidence From California, 3 WOODROW WILSON L. J. 11 (1980) [hereinafter
Bronson II]; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death Qualification and Jury
Attitudes, 8 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) [hereinafter Fitzgerald]; Louis Harris & Associ-
ates, Inc., Study No. 2016 (1971) [hereinafter Harris]; Precision Research, Inc., Survey No.
1286 (1981) [hereinafter Precision Survey].
The court categorized the following studies as "conviction-proneness" surveys:
Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors' Predisposition to
Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 53 (1984) [hereinafter
Cowan]; Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples, Jury Bias, and Use of
Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970) [here-
inafter Goldberg];Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified"Jury on the Guilt Determi-
nation Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971) [hereinafter Jurow]; Wilson, Belief in Capital
Punishment and Jury Performance (unpublished) (1964) [hereinafter Wilson]; Zeisel,
Some Data on Juror Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment (University of Chicago Mono-
graph) (1968) [hereinafter Zeisel].
The court categorized the following studies as "other surveys": Haney, On the Selection
of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 121
(1984) [hereinafter Haney]; Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Atti-
tudes and Conviction Proneness, 8 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984) [hereinafter Thompson]; A.
Young, Arkansas Archival Study (unpublished) (1981) [hereinafter Young]. See Grigsby v.
Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). In addition, McCree had presented several other surveys con-
ducted by various national polling organizations, which tended to show that blacks and
women disproportionately opposed the death penalty and were more likely to be excluded
in a capital case because of their views: Harris & Associates, Inc., American Institute for
Public Opinion (Gallup), National Opinion Research Center, and several national polls
from 1953 through 1978. Brief for Respondent at 98, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758
(1986).
59. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1324 (E.D. Ark. 1983).
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for several novel reasons. First, the court determined that the sixth
amendment "fair cross-section" requirement applied to petit juries, the
juries actually seated to hear the case, as well as the venire and the origi-
nal jury list, and that the excluded "biased but unbiased" jurors consti-
tuted a cognizable group for sixth amendment purposes. These
conclusions led it to accept McCree's argument that the exclusion of
these jurors violated the sixth amendment. 60 The court also determined
that the fifteen social science studies provided a valid and reasonable
basis from which to conclude that such a group would tend to favor the
prosecution in determining guilt or innocence. The court saw no incon-
sistency between its holdings and the decisions in Adams and Witt, which
had moved away from the generally stricter standards announced in
Witherspoon for reviewing challenges for cause of equivocating jurors.
6 1
B. Conflict Among the Circuits
The Eighth Circuit's holding was unique. Although other appellate
courts had considered the question, they had unanimously determined
that venire members disqualified on sentence could properly be ex-
cluded from the guilt-innocence trial. 6 2 In Smith v. Balkcom,6 3 for exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that exclusion of "biased but
unbiased" venire members was unconstitutional because the resulting
jury was conviction-prone. To support this contention, the petitioner in
Smith had presented thirteen studies similar to those presented in Mc-
Cree.64 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that even if it assumed that the results
of the studies were accurate, the petitioner had no constitutional right to
have Witherspoon excludable jurors determine his guilt. The court stated:
[The fact that a] death-qualified jury is more likely to convict
than a non-death-qualified jury does not demonstrate which
jury is impartial. It indicates only that a death-qualified jury
might favor the prosecution and that a non-death-qualified jury
might favor the defendant.
65
Nor did the court believe that Witherspoon excludables who could claim
to be impartial in determining guilt were a distinctive group whose ex-
clusion by the state violated the "fair cross-section" requirement of the
sixth amendment. Neither the state nor the petitioner was entitled to a
juror whose interests and biases prevented him from considering the
facts with an open mind. "A cross-section of the fair and impartial is
more desirable," reasoned the court, "than a fair cross-section of the
60. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 231-32 revd sub. nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758
(1986).
61. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 415-16 (1985).
62. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
63. 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied sub
nom. Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
64. Compare Smith, 660 F.2d at 577 n.8 (listing studies presented by petitioner) with
Gngsby, 758 F.2d at 232-35 (listing studies presented by respondent, McCree).
65. Smith, 660 F.2d at 578 quoting Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 584 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
prejudiced and biased." 6 6
The Fourth Circuit reached the same result by a slightly different
analysis in Keeten v. Garrison.6 7 In Keeten, the court questioned the per-
suasiveness of the statistical data submitted by the respondent because
the state had presented strong statistical evidence showing that the stud-
ies were poorly designed, lacked random sampling, and were not moni-
tored for internal consistency. 6 8 Even assuming the accuracy of such
statistics, however, the Fourth Circuit found that a large portion of
Witherspoon excludables were likely to be "nullifiers" when determining
guilt or innocence, and, thus, they could be properly excluded under a
sixth amendment analysis. 6 9 As to respondents' fourteenth amendment
due process argument, the court determined that a capital defendant
was entitled to a fair jury, not a jury biased in favor of a not-guilty ver-
dict. 70 The Eighth Circuit in McCree was the only federal circuit court to
disagree.
C. McCree in the Supreme Court
Speaking for a six-member majority in the Supreme Court, Justice
Rehnquist reversed the Eighth Circuit in McCree. The majority first re-
jected the Eighth Circuit's holding that the fifteen social science studies
supported the thesis that removal for cause of "biased but unbiased"
jurors resulted in conviction-prone juries. The majority pointed out
that only six of the studies in question dealt specifically with the poten-
tial effect of striking Witherspoon excludables from the guilt-innocence
phase of the trial, three of which were considered and rejected as insuffi-
cient data in Witherspoon itself.7 1 Only one of the three new studies at-
tempted to quantify the effect "nullifiers" would have if permitted to
serve on the guilt-innocence portion of a capital trial. 72 None of the
studies predicted whether the presence of "biased but unbiased" jurors
in determining guilt would have altered the result .in an actual trial.
73
The majority next rejected McCree's sixth amendment argument by
reasoning that the right to a fair cross-section of the community did not
extend beyond jury venires to actual petit juries. The task of providing
66. Smith, 660 F.2d at 583.
67. 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2259 (1986).
68. Id. at 132. Additionally, the state had presented studies of Dr. Steven Penrod, a
psychologist who specializes in researching jurors and their attitudes. Dr. Penrod's studies
concluded that there was little correlation between jurors' attitudes about the criminal
justice system and their verdicts in the mock trials that he had conducted. Other expert
witnesses for the state testified at trial that respondent Keeten's studies failed to show a
strong correlation between jurors' attitudes and their possible verdicts in death penalty
cases. The state contended that they did show, however, that "opposition to the death
penalty strongly increases the likelihood of juror nullification." Id. Many of these same
studies were again presented in Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985).
69. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133. The court reasoned that a capital defendant does not
have a constitutional right to be tried by jurors who cannot follow the law.
70. Id. at 134.
71. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1762-63 nn.4 & 8 (1986).




each criminal defendant with a truly representative petit jury, as op-
posed to a venire, stated the Court, was a "practical impossibility."
74
Even if the sixth amendment were extended to petit juries, the majority
would still reject the "death-qualified" challenge because shared atti-
tude groups would not meet the requirement of a "distinct, cognizable
group." The majority observed that the fair cross-section requirement
had always been based upon the ability to recognize a distinct, cogniza-
ble group and to show that the group's wholesale exclusion from jury
service was unrelated to individual members' ability to serve. 75 Qualifi-
cation of jurors with respect to sentence was related to the legitimate
state goal of obtaining a jury that would be fair and impartial.
76
The majority also did not view respondent's fourteenth amendment
argument with favor. Although the majority agreed that respondent was
entitled to a fair and impartial jury under the fourteenth amendment, it
refused to interpret this principle as a requirement that a capital jury be
"balanced" at the guilt-innocence stage by the inclusion of Witherspoon
excludables, who would allegedly view the state's evidence more criti-
cally and be less conviction-prone. The fourteenth amendment, rea-
soned the Court, does not require any particular mix of jurors on the
panel.
77
Lastly, the Court harmonized its holding with the Witherspoon-Adams-
Witt 7 8 line of decisions. It rejected the argument that those decisions
implied a constitutional violation whenever the state excludes a group
that might favor the defense. Unlike the Illinois jury system of Wither-
spoon, the applicable Arkansas procedure served several important func-
tions. These functions included maintenance of a unitary jury system, in
which a capital defendant benefited at the sentencing stage from a jury's
residual doubts about guilt, and which required that the evidence at trial
be presented only once. 79 The Court also referred to the dissent in Ad-
ants, which had reasoned that a jury's role at guilt-innocence was primar-
ily that of a fact-finder with limited discretion, unlike its role in
sentencing.
8 0
D. Justice Marshall's Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dis-
74. Id. at 1765.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1766.
77. Id. at 1767. The Court observed that if McCree's argument that the 14th amend-
ment required a perfectly balanced jury were adopted, it would necessitate a "Sisyphean
task of balancing juries, making sure that each contains the proper number of Democrats
and Republicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar executives and blue-collar
laborers, and so on," as well as abandoning the practice of using peremptory challenges.
Id.
78. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980);
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
79. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1768.
80. Id. at 1769-70 citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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sented. 8 ' They argued that Witherspoon specifically stated that if a poten-
tial death penalty recipient made the proper statistical showing that
exclusion of potential jurists, unbiased on guilt from the guilt-innocence
determination, would result in a more conviction-prone jury, the Court
would find a constitutional violation.8 2 According to the dissent, Mc-
Cree had made such a showing. Additionally, the dissent claimed that
"there [were] no studies which contradict the studies submitted by the
respondent; in other words, all documented studies support the district
court's findings." 8 3 Authorizing conviction-prone juries to judge guilt
or innocence in a capital case was particularly unacceptable, reasoned
the dissenters, since death penalty defendants should be protected by
"unique safeguards" against erroneous convictions.
The dissent did not rely upon the sixth amendment or upon a fair
cross-section analysis to support its position, except in passing. 84 In-
stead, Justice Marshall reasoned that the statistical studies supported a
finding that McCree's jury was conviction-prone, in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 5 In reply to the Court's
assertion that Adams viewed the jury as performing a different function at
guilt-innocence than at sentencing, the dissent interpreted Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent in Adams to the contrary and argued that both stages of
the trial required juries representative of the conscience of the commu-
nity and who are properly "balanced."
'86
The dissent supported these arguments by referring to Ballew v.
Georgia, in which the Court held Georgia's authorization of criminal ju-
ries of fewer than six members unconstitutional. 8 7 The Court in Ballew
concluded that this reduction in the number of members made the jury
less conducive to careful deliberation and accurate fact-finding. 8 8 The
dissent reasoned that by keeping venire members disqualified on sen-
tence from determining guilt or innocence, the majority in McCree had
sanctioned juries that were, like the juries in Ballew, "likely to be defi-
cient in the quality of their deliberations, the accuracy of their results,
81. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1771-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1773 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 238
(8th Cir. 1985)', rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)).
84. Id. at 1775 n.6 (MarshallJ., dissenting). In a footnote, the dissent argued that the
wholesale exclusion of any "distinction group" from a jury panel has the same practical
effect as excluding such a group from the venire. For this reason, the dissent agreed with
McCree that exclusion at voir dire of "biased but unbiased" jurors from determining guilt
or innocence in a capital case was a violation of the fair cross-section requirement of the
sixth amendment. Id.
85. Id. at 1774 (Marshall, J., dissenting). These survey results made the Court's opin-
ion even more troublesome to the dissent because Witt had broadened the definition of
excludable jurors in capital cases, thus making the resulting jury more arguably convic-
tion-prone than it would have been if the Witherspoon test had been applied. Id.
86. Id. at 1777 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Ballew, 435 U.S. 223 (1978)).
88. Id. at 1778-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This conclusion was supported in Battew
by reference to more than 31 studies, all of which concluded that decreasing the number
of deliberating jurors also decreased the quality of their deliberation. Ballew, 435 U.S. at
231-39. The Court discounted the three studies relied upon by the state because of diffi-
culties those studies presented in their methodology. Id. at 242-43.
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the degree to which they favor the prosecution, and the extent to which
they adequately represent minority groups in the community." 89
The dissent also rejected the Court's conclusion that the state had a
substantial interest in identifying and excluding "nullifiers" before the
guilt stage of the trial. In the dissent's opinion, such an identification
procedure could be easily accomplished by allowing the state to ask pro-
spective jurors if they could be fair in judging the defendant's guilt or
innocence, without delving into their views on capital punishment.9 0
The dissenters were not persuaded that practical limitations on the accu-
racy of such an inquiry were so significant as to justify exclusion of
Witherspoon excludables from the guilt-innocence trial.
III. ANALYSIS OF MCCREE
There are at least four kinds of analyses to which the Supreme
Court's holding in McCree might productively be subjected. The first
inquiry might be whether the unitary jury used by Arkansas has real ad-
vantages, as the majority concluded it did and, if so, whether they can
easily be achieved by other means, as the dissent argued. A second con-
cern might be whether meaningful numbers of venire members substan-
tially biased on sentence, yet unbiased on guilt, can be reliably identified
through voir dire examination, as the dissenters maintained, or, as sev-
eral states argued as amici curiae, whether this inquiry would be too inter-
nally contradictory to produce meaningful results in courtroom
examinations of the real lay members in a venire. Third, it may be use-
ful to compare the "biased but unbiased" venire members at issue with
the kinds of excluded groups of which the Court has taken cognizance
for sixth amendment purposes. Finally, it might be productive to ex-
amine the Eighth Circuit's reliance on social scientific studies as the ba-
sis for its conclusion that McCree's jury was unconstitutionally
conviction-prone, and the Supreme Court's rejection of that reasoning.
A. The Value of the Unitary Jury
The dissent in McCree was based upon the argument that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment required a neutral jury se-
lection process, rather than upon an argument invoking the sixth
amendment prohibition of invidious discrimination against cognizable
89. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1778 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Although the dissent claimed
that more blacks than whites would be stricken from jury panels under the Court's analy-
sis, the dissent did not rely on this argument to find a violation of the sixth amendment fair
cross-section requirement, but suggested that it might, however, be of constitutional sig-
nificance under the 14th amendment. Contra Ballew, 435 U.S. at 239.
90. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1780 (Marshall,J., dissenting) The dissent stated: "It over-
looks, however, the ease with which nullifiers could be identified before trial without any
extended focus on how jurors would conduct themselves at a capital sentencing proceed-
ing. Potential jurors could be asked, for example, 'if there be an) reason why any of them
could not fairly and impartially try the issue of defendant's guilt in accordance with the
evidence presented at the trial and the court's instructions as to the law.' ") Id. (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (quoting Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1310 (E.D, Ark. 1983)).
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groups. 9 1 The dissenters believed that by excluding the "biased but un-
biased" juror from determining a capital defendant's guilt or innocence,
the state actually would produce a jury biased in favor of the prosecu-
tion. 9 2 In making this argument, the dissent appeared to be balancing
the interests of the defendant against the state's interest in its unitary
jury procedure, rejecting the notion that the state had rational reasons
for preferring a unitary jury system.
In any fourteenth amendment analysis, courts have traditionally
considered the constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial in the
context of the state's legitimate interests in the procedure. The weight-
ier the state's legitimate interest in the procedure, the more likely the
procedure will pass constitutional muster. 9 3 In this instance, the proce-
dure at issue was the state's decision to have a single jury decide both
guilt-innocence and sentence in a capital case. The only state interests
the dissent found potentially applicable were its interest in efficiency and
expense and the possibility that a single jury might be less likely to as-
sess death if its members had residual doubts about guilt. The dissent
deemed the first interest "unconvincing" and the second "offensive."
'94
1. Avoiding the Reduction of Shared Decisionmaking
Responsibility: The Unitary Jury and the
"Residual Doubt"
Contrary to the dissent's position, however, Arkansas did not argue
or recognize efficiency and expense as a justification for its unitary jury
procedure in capital cases. 9 5 If it had, the dissent would have been cor-
rect in rejecting the argument because time and cost has proved to be
insufficient to reduce jury size.96 Arkansas did argue, however, that the
Supreme Court of Arkansas had specifically recognized the theory that
separate juries might have the effect of reducing the individual jurors'
responsibility for deciding a difficult and severe outcome. 97 There may
be more merit to this argument than the dissent was willing to concede.
The responsibility of deciding guilt in a capital case weighs heavily
on jurors. The analysis necessary to decide guilt, followed in sequence
by the responsibility in the same individuals to determine sentence,
prompts significant caution in most jurors at both the guilt-innocence
and the sentencing stages of a capital trial. Conversely, the most effec-
tive argument the defense may have against the death penalty in many
cases is that of residual doubt about guilt.9 8 Even aside from that effect,
91. Id. at 1775-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1778-79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 1769, 1779. See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
94. HcCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1780-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. See Brief for Petitioner at 6-8, Lockhart v McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
96. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 243-44 (1978).
97. Brief for Petitioner at 14, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (citing Rector v. State, 280 Ark.
385, 395, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2370 (1984)).
98. This is a "particularly powerful" argument, according to a publication of the Na-
tional College for Criminal Defense. The College urges defense attorneys to argue that
death "is an absolute punishment and. . . is not appropriate for one who is not absolutely
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jurors who have shared the moral responsibility for a community finding
of guilt and who have deliberated over the existence of small remaining
doubts are often induced to be more cautious later in considering the
death penalty. Thus the unitary jury can serve as an important addi-
tional safeguard against erroneous use of capital punishment. Indeed,
the Arkansas procedure is even a possible explanation for Ardia Mc-
Cree's own life sentence and his avoidance of the death penalty.
This concern was articulated by the Fifth Circuit in Smith v.
Balkcom.9 9 The court, while assuming the case of a capital defendant
who had been convicted of a capital crime and who faced the trial that
would determine his sentence, stated:
A new jury, including only those willing to impose the death
penalty, would be selected. They would entertain no doubt
that the defendant before them was, indeed, the guilty party.
Presumably they would be instructed that the defendant was
the guilty party .... Not even a flimsy alibi would disturb their
deliberations; no suggestion of misidentification would be ma-
terial. Some may conclude that the destruction of the whimsi-
cal doubt sought here would involve a more serious
deprivation of the benefits of the constitutionally guaranteed
jury trial than envisioned by Smith's advocates in this
appeal. 100
The dissenters in McCree found such an argument "offensive" and
"cruel."11 They maintained that if the state was sincere in its claim that
it was acting in the defendant's best interests in maintaining a unitary
jury scheme, it should at least permit the defendant to waive this benev-
olence in favor of having two juries, so that "biased but unbiased" jurors
could determine guilt or innocence.
10 2
Arkansas may have had substantial reasons, however, for avoiding
the choice advocated by the dissenters. For example, it may have con-
cluded that a sentence of death should not be made to depend, or ap-
pear to depend, upon a strategic choice of this kind. Granted that
strategy does influence outcomes, and that offering the defendant a
choice is sometimes appropriate, Arkansas may have concluded that it
should not encourage what would amount to an all-or-nothing,
guilty (if there are lingering doubts about the evidence)." Kammen, Final Arguments in a
Death Penalty Case, National College for Criminal Defense Death Penalty Defense 13 (1983). See also
Texas District & County Attorneys Ass 'n, Capital Murder Seminar A- 1 (1980) (evidence of guilt
that is less than ironclad often leads a jury not to return the death penalty). Thus, in one
particularly grisly case involving the rape-murders of two young women, defense counsel's
final argument on punishment was less than 30 seconds long and included the following:
"You've convicted the wrong man. You should have found him not guilty. And since you
shouldn't have convicted him in the first place, I'm not going to plead for his life now."
The jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. Defense counsel
attributed this verdict to the fact that "the jury had a doubt about [whether the defendant]
did it." D. CRUMP & G. JACOBS, CAPITAL MURDER 121-24 (1977) [hereinafter D. Crump].
99. 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858, cert. denied sub
nom. Tison v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 882 (1982).
100. Smith, 660 F.2d. at 581.
101. .MlcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1781-82 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 106 S. Ct. at 1781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
riverboat gamble on a matter of pure procedure if the defendant were
given the choice. Moreover, Arkansas could sensibly have concluded
that it would be unfair or impractical to force such a choice on a capital
defendant before the guilt-innocence trial and then, in the event of con-
viction, to consider it as binding him in the sentencing trial. This choice
is likely to benefit only a small number of defendants because most capi-
tal cases are not prosecuted unless there is strong proof of guilt due to
the high costs to the state.10 3 It would clearly work to the disadvantage
of a substantial number of those who were found guilty and who had
chosen a two-jury alternative if the dissenters' arguments are accepted.
The strategic position of a person who has made a bad choice, and who
earnestly asks for a second chance in the light of subsequent informa-
tion, suggests that enforcement of the binding nature of the election
would be difficult.
Even if the dissent's suggestion had merit, one need not conclude
that it is required by the Constitution. Perhaps a legislature could ra-
tionally enact the dissenters' proposal allowing for the defendant's risky
choice. Arguments are available, however, to be made against that
model, and due to the state's legislative discretion, they support Arkan-
sas's selection of a different model.
2. The Defendant's Counter-Proposals: The "Twenty-Four
Member" Jury, Replacement Schemes, and Ad Hoc Size
McCree suggested, on the other hand, that the state's valid con-
cerns could be addressed by other procedures that would retain Wither-
spoon excludables unbiased on guilt.10 4 For example, he argued that the
state could impanel two juries simultaneously. The first jury would in-
clude members who were "biased but unbiased." The second would
not. Both juries would hear evidence of guilt, but only the first jury
would decide that issue. The second jury's function would be to decide
punishment if that issue were reached. In this manner, residual doubts
about guilt still could be entertained by the punishment jury, and the
trial would need to be held only once. 1 0 5
103. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
104. McCree, in his response to the Petition for Certiorari, stated that Arkansas was
"free to empanel additional jurors, to have two juries hear the case simultaneously, to
move toward judge sentencing, to entrust the jury deliberations to whatever jurors are
selected, or to employ any other procedural device that avoids systematic exclusion of
Witherspoon excludable jurors." Memorandum of Respondent in Response to Petition for
Certiorari, Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
105. See Colussi, The Unconstitutionality of Death Qualifying a Jury Prior to the Determination of
Guilt: The Fair Cross-Section Requirement in Capital Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595, 616-17
(1982) [hereinafter Colussi]. The district court, taking McCree's suggestions into account,
ordered Arkansas to empanel a second jury purged of "biased but unbiased"jurors as well
as Witherspoon excludables, to decide the penalty issue once a defendant was found guilty of
capital murder. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1320 (E.D. Ark. 1983). The Eighth
Circuit modified this requirement by leaving "the procedure to be followed to secure an
impartial jury in the guilt-innocence trial . . . to the states." Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d
226, 242-43 (1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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The Arkansas legislature might sensibly have decided, however,
that this two-jury procedure would not be fairer to capital defendants
than the unitary jury; arguably, the Arkansas legislature could have con-
cluded such a proposal would be worse for defendants. The presence of
both juries would be a dramatic way of impressing all twenty-four jurors
with their limited roles. Furthermore, the deliberate impaneling of a
separate sentencing jury, before defendant's guilt was established,
would carry an obvious and undesirable message to jurors deciding guilt
or innocence. Perhaps most importantly, the sentencing jurors would
not share the experience of grappling with large and small doubts dur-
ing deliberations on guilt. 10 6 Arkansas could have sensibly concluded
that the elimination of this experience would remove an important re-
straint that its system provided against the inappropriate imposition of
capital punishment.
Similar deficiencies are innate in the suggestion, also made by Mc-
Cree, of partially replacingjury members at the sentencing stage.' 0 7 Ar-
kansas could have reasonably concluded that the new jurors would be
relieved of responsibility for deciding guilt. Those remaining from the
guilt stage would be impressed with the finality of that decision by the
departure of jurors with whom they had shared deliberations, but who
were not fit to determine punishment because their views were too ex-
treme. This system might also work to the disadvantage of capital de-
fendants. McCree also suggested that sentencing juries could be
composed by removing Witherspoon excludables without replacing
them. 10 8 This procedure would leave death penalty decisions to be
made by a jury of ad hoc size, with no clear remedy for the possibility
that the number might be reduced below acceptable levels. It would
also retain most of the disadvantages of the replacement proposal.
Furthermore, the Arkansas legislature might have concluded that
the possible detriments of the two-jury proposal were not confined to
the sentencing stage. It could have considered the possibility that ifju-
rors knew that their verdict of guilt would lead to the acceptance of re-
sponsibility of another body of jurors for determining punishment,
some individuals might also be less restrained in finding guilt precisely
because they could pass on to another body the responsibility for decid-
ing the ultimate disposition. The seriousness of the guilt decision thus
would be reduced, at least in some individuals, by the division of respon-
sibility. Although these are not necessary conclusions, and indeed their
validity or significance may be the subjects of substantial disagreement,
they do seem to be within the realm of considerations that legitimately
can influence a legislature.
106. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. See also Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 247 (Gibson,
J., dissenting).
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
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3. The Argument for Elimination of Jury Sentencing
In requiring two differently composed bodies to ensure that "biased
but unbiased" jurors decide guilt or innocence, the dissent did not con-
front another potentially harmful effect of its proposal. If the dissent
had prevailed, states might legitimately decide that the values of jury
sentencing were outweighed by the probability of hidden nullifiers, the
unfairness to some defendants, the likelihood of ambiguities in the se-
lection process, the resulting increase in appellate reversals, and the di-
minished accuracy and increased complexity of voir dire examination.
In short, some states might regard the two-jury requirement as so cum-
bersome that they would prefer to abolish jury sentencing and have cap-
ital punishment imposed exclusively by judges.' 0 9
Although the dissent did not discuss this possibility, McCree did. In
his response to the petition for certiorari, McCree argued that Arkansas,
to protect its legitimate interests, was "free . . . to move toward judge
sentencing."' 10 During oral argument, McCree's attorney candidly con-
firmed that the choice of abolishing juries for sentencing purposes was
constitutionally available to the states.''' However, McCree's attorney
refused to admit that the practical effect might influence the state's in-
terest in retaining a unitary jury.
Although sentencing by judges has been held constitutional" 12 and
has advantages, it is not desired by many capital defendants because of
the result.' 13 The record in McCree demonstrates the "conventional wis-
dom" that judges generally are more conviction-prone than juries.' 14
This principle would seem to imply, under the reasoning of McCree, that
109. Id. Arguments attempting to make the law regarding jury sentencing so draconian
that it cannot possibly function have also been generally rejected by the Court. See Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (rejecting an argument that an "automatic" set
of procedures to determine a capital defendant's guilt and punishment should be insti-
tuted, with the observation that such a requirement would effectively prohibit capital pun-
ishment by imposing impossible conditions for its use).
110. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Ill. See 54 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1986) (No. 92-212).
112. Lockhart v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (reversed on other grounds); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
113. Judge-sentencing has the arguable virtue of greater consistency which is an impor-
tant value in death penalty cases. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(Douglas, J.,
concurring). Juries, however, have advantages such as community restraint, greater repre-
sentation, and absence of "professional bias." See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-
56 (1968).
114. The district court record included the following testimony:
The Witness: What I'm saying is it's true of any of us. As a parent, as a teacher,
the first time a student comes to me and says, 'I missed the exam. I have been
sick,' I believe it. And the second time I believe it. The third time. By the time
I've heard it for 15 years university teaching, I must confess I have developed a
certain degree of cynicism. And I'm simply saying a judge who has heard a possi-
ble but not probable alibi defense or anyone who has heard these things before
The Court: The conventional wisdom is you don't try your case to the judge
unless your client is innocent.
Ms. Fewell: So you are implying in that statement that judges are more convic-
tion-prone?
The Witness: Well, as I think his Honor was saying, only on the facts.
Record at 674, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1759 (1986)(testimony of witness Bronson);
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judges might also sentence more harshly. Judges are less ethnically di-
verse than juries, 1 5 and they arguably are underinclusive of minorities
who would be more hesitant in death sentencing. For this reason, it
would be ironic if McCree's arguments resulted in the substitution of
judges forjuries. States may also view judge sentencing as less desirable
because they prefer to have such serious matters decided by a group
more likely to weigh and measure conflicting arguments and decide
them according to community standards. 116 If one concludes that the
use of jurors for capital sentencing should not be made so cumbersome
as to force states to choose judge sentencing when they prefer to retain
juries, the decision of the Court in McCree can be supported by the ob-
servation that it tended to retain jury sentencing as a viable alternative.
A. The Feasibility of Identifying "Biased But Unbiased" Venire Members
The dissent in McCree concluded that venire members biased on
sentence, but unbiased on guilt or innocence, could be identified
through practical procedures. Specifically, the dissenters suggested that
there should be a two-step voir dire examination in capital cases. Dur-
ing the first stage, attorneys should be permitted to ask whether pro-
spective jurors believed they could be fair, without delving into their
views on the death penalty, although presumably not concealing that the
case was a capital one. Jurors qualified by this questioning would deter-
mine the defendant's guilt or innocence. During the second stage, at-
torneys could qualify prospective jurors who would determine
punishment, much in the same manner as is presently done under
Witherspoon and Witt. The dissenters believed that this procedure would
ensure that a death penalty defendant would receive a fair trial as to his
guilt because his jury could contain members who were substantially op-
posed to capital punishment but who could fairly, if not more sympa-
thetically, view the evidence in his favor. The dissenters concluded,
indeed, that the state could accomplish the result easily by this proce-
dure, and they explained that in their view such an analysis was invited
by Witherspoon.' 1
7
The dissent rested upon the assumption that "biased, yet unbiased"
venire members are sufficiently numerous to be significant and can be
identified with reasonable accuracy through voir dire examination. Such
a venire member must, by hypothesis, regard capital punishment as so
repugnant that he cannot conform to the law governing its imposition.
Yet, simultaneously, he must be capable of impartially deciding guilt or
see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-65 (1966)(judges more likely to
convict when judges and juries disagree).
115. A recent survey revealed that in 1985, the average number of minorities in state
judicial positions was 5.4%. Of this figure, Blacks accounted for 3.8%, and Hispanics ac-
counted for 1.2%. NAT'L LAwJ., Dec. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (citing The Success of Women
and Minorities in Achieving Judicial Office, a study done by the Fund for Modern Courts
in New York City in 1985).
116. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
117. ,VcCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1780-81.
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innocence while knowing that his guilty verdict is a step toward the im-
position of precisely the penalty he finds so abhorrent, completely free
of that consideration. In the Supreme Court, several states as amici cu-
riae quoted a hypothetical venire member's explanation of this "biased,
yet unbiased" state of mind:' 18
Yes, I do absolutely oppose capital punishment. No, I can-
not imagine any case (no matter how aggravated and no matter
how terrifying) in which I could even contemplate a death sen-
tence. Yes, it is absolute. I am not merely opposed to capital
punishment, I categorically exclude, as barbaric and immoral,
even the possibility of it.
However, I could act to find a person guilty of a capital
crime, knowing that I will then participate in making him face
the sentence of death because of my finding. Furthermore,
when I do that, I can remain completely free from any consider-
ation of my opinion that no civilized person would participate
in findings that could lead to capital punishment.
Yes, I could decide the issue of guilt impartially in a capital
case. No, I would not be influenced in the slightest to vote
against conviction because of my revulsion toward capital pun-
ishment. Even though I categorically reject even the possibility
of my being a part of a body that imposes the death penalty,
and even though I know that my decision on guilt would be an
inexorable part of that process in that it would lead to a deci-
sion on precisely that immoral and barbaric penalty, I would
decide guilt without being influenced at all by my convictions in
this regard.
The existence of persons with this state of mind is possible; perhaps the
dissenters were even justified in concluding that the existence of such
persons was probable." 9 Most individuals, however, would find the two
states of mind incompatible, and the hypothesized responses seem more
likely to be the result of poor communication than of a potential juror's
real attitudes. The difficulty in accepting the dissenter's argument,
therefore, lies in the proposition that numerous individuals of this "bi-
ased but unbiased" state of mind can be identified easily and accurately.
In fact, application of the simpler Witherspoon-Witt distinction, to
identify persons qualified as impartial on sentence and to separate them
from those disqualified on sentence, already requires great effort in the
lower court.' 20 It is unusual that a venire member comes to the court-
room with an innately formulated position articulated in precise Wither-
spoon-Witt terms, even if disqualified. Frequently, the initial response of
such a potential juror is "against" the death penalty. Such a response
may or may not indicate disqualification, and further questioning may be
118. Brief for Amici Curiae Alabama, Connecticut, et al. at 13-14, Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
119. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1772 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
120. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25 n.6 (1985). See Schnapper, Taking




necessary to obtain more precise Witherspoon- Witt information.121
The result is often equivocation. The venire member is being asked
whether he would violate the law if seated on a jury, and such an admis-
sion is not easily made. The process of adversary questioning increases
this problem. Even if a prospective juror understands the inquiry com-
pletely and accurately, it is often difficult to express a clear answer when
opposing counsel word questions and misconstrue answers strategically.
Jurors frequently feel so pressed that they refuse to answer questions or
are reduced to tears. The record in McCree reflects examples of this be-
havior,12 2 as do the opinions of several appellate courts.
12 3
For example, in O'Bryan v. Estelle, 124 questioning of some individual
jurors occupied as much as forty pages of transcript. The three venire
members who were the focus of the Fifth Circuit's review were each
asked dozens of times in dozens of different ways about their views, in
an effort to resolve the Witherspoon-Witt inquiry. Their answers were re-
peatedly evasive, contradictory and nonresponsive. One member of the
jury described himself as a "borderline tinker on the subject."' 12 5 When
asked whether he could decide the facts impartially, notwithstanding his
absolute opposition to the death penalty, this potential juror replied: 1
26
I believe I would, as you say as facts, I don't know. Like I say, I
would have reservations really regardless of what we consider
facts in myself. I mean as far as a personal belief. I wouldn't
elaborate to a greater extent, but I would think other than the
fact... [sic].
These garbled responses are typical of those that the Witherspoon- Witt
inquiry sometimes produces, even in thoughtful and articulate lay
persons.
Such responses indicate that if capital cases are to be decided with
consistency, there is a need for keeping the inquiry as simple and clear
as possible. The arguments of the McCree dissent,' 2 7 however, would
overlay the existing Witherspoon-Witt inquiry by the addition of a more
finely graded sub-category of "biased yet unbiased" venire members,
which would be defined by another set of legal concepts that courts and
venire members presumably would have even greater difficulty in inter-
121. D. Crump, supra note 98, at 541-42.
122. See Record at 643-45, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 ("You can see a very measured
physical response from most people, even the most conservative will have some response;
you can tell the breathing, heaving of chest, some folks will tear, some folks won't make
any eye contact. It's a very difficult situation for a person to be in.") (testimony of expert
witness Piazza).
123. E.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1981). The following exchange in
Granviel came after a series of equivocal responses and adversary questioning: "The
Court: 'Mrs. Wallace, I am sure you do feel very deeply about this. It's brought tears to
your eyes; is that right?' Venirewoman Wallace: 'Yes.' " Id. at 687. See also Williams v.
Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); Burns v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 396 (5th Cir.
1980); D. Crump, supra note 98, at 61.
124. 714 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).
125. Record at 877, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
126. Id.
127. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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preting. This more complex inquiry would further decrease the likeli-
hood that venire members would be accurately categorized. It also
would make it more difficult to obtain even-handed and consistent de-
terminations of guilt or innocence in capital cases, a goal so fundamen-
tal in death penalty cases that it was the basis for wholesale invalidation
of capital punishment statutes in Furman v. Georgia.
128
Several appellate courts have raised a second concern about the Mc-
Cree dissenters' proposal. These courts have perceived the possibility
that persons absolutely opposed to capital punishment might consider it
their duty to serve on the jury at the guilt stage and to nullify the possi-
bility of a death sentence by voting for acquittal regardless of the evi-
dence. 129 One judge referred to such an individual as the "lying"
juror.130 While deliberate falsification is possible, it seems more likely
that a venire member would become a hidden nullifier merely because
he has overestimated his or her capacity to decide impartially on the
basis of the evidence, regardless of the consequences. The Fifth Circuit
explained the dilemma facing such a juror as follows:
A juror who has such deeply-seated conscientious scruples
against the death penalty might find himself confronting a
grisly choice. If, because of his scruples, he votes to acquit, he
must risk hanging the jury. Similarly motivated votes by other
jurors in subsequent trials and retrials could, in effect, result in
near immunity from crimes for which the death penalty can be
imposed, which would frustrate Florida's interest in the just
and even handed application of its laws, including the death
penalty statute. '31
The Spinkellink court concluded that Florida's "fundamental" interest in
avoiding this result justified its exclusion of such a venire member from
deciding guilt or innocence, as well as sentence.i
3 2
It seems reasonable to conclude, as did the court in Spinkellink, that
there are some states of mind that make impartiality so difficult that the
law is justified in treating them as unattainable. For example, if a de-
fendant's brother were a member of a venire, no court would prohibit a
state from excluding him even if he claimed that he could decide guilt
with impartiality. The moral and emotional effect of family membership
is too likely to countermand the most honest commitment to impartiality
in such a case. For similar reasons, the state may harbor justified skepti-
cism about a Witherspoon excludable's ability to put aside a deeply held
religious, moral or ethical belief against capital punishment and to con-
128. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
129. See, e.g., Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 766 (1940) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (possibility that such a juror "can hang the jury if he cannot have his way");
Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986);
United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954) (concern that such a jury would be "in
reality a 'partisan jury' ").
130. O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 406 (5th Cir. 1983) (Buchmeyer, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1013 (1984).
131. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979).
132. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d 596-98.
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vict a defendant knowing that the sentence of death is the likely result.
The probability is high that any predictions of this nature would be a
product of poor communication during voir dire examination, confu-
sion, or overestimation by the venire member of his capacity for making
a coldly logical decision. If these conclusions are accepted, a state
should be constitutionally permitted to conclude that Witherspoon exclud-
ables who convincingly predict impartiality in determining guilt or inno-
cence would be so few, so difficult to identify, and so likely in any event
to frustrate the evenhanded adjudication of capital cases, that they
should be excluded from sitting in these cases in any capacity.
B. "Biased but Unbiased' Jurors as a Cognizable Class
Another significant holding of McCree was that jurors who were bi-
ased on sentence, but who could be unbiased in determining guilt or
innocence, did not constitute a cognizable class for purposes of the sixth
amendment. 133 The dissent in McCree found it unnecessary to analyze
the issue because it had concluded that the respondent had been de-
prived of a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.
134
The sixth amendment has been interpreted to mean that a criminal
defendant cannot be deprived of a jury selected from a "fair cross-sec-
tion" of the community. 135 Perhaps more accurately, it has been charac-
terized as prohibiting the systematic or invidious exclusion of any
"cognizable group" from the venire.13 6 This requirement has generally
been applied only to venires, not petit juries.
13 7
There are several reasons for this prohibition. First, venires com-
posed of a "fair cross-section" of the community are thought to "guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power" by the state. Second, if all sec-
tions of the community are allowed to participate on the venire, it is
believed that the public's confidence in the criminal justice system will
be preserved. Third, the requirement ensures that all portions of soci-
ety will share "in the administration of justice" as a "phase of civil
responsibility." 138
Although federal courts have yet to define precisely what consti-
tutes a "cognizable group" for sixth amendment purposes, they have
generally recognized that the group must be identifiable in some objec-
tive and discernible way.13 9 Another factor has been whether the larger
community has exhibited prejudice against the group so that its exclu-
sion is based upon reasons other than ability to serve. 140 Under these
133. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
134. Id. at 1775 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
135. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968).
136. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
137. Id. at 363-64.
138. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31.
139. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (1986). See also, Duren, 439 U.S. 522
(1979); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977).
140. Potter, 552 F.2d at 904-05.
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criteria, courts have recognized cognizable groups that have included
economic, social, religious, political, racial and geographical entities,
14 1
as well as groups based on gender.
14 2
Applying these principles, the Court in McCree concluded that "bi-
ased but unbiased" jurors were not a cognizable group for sixth amend-
ment purposes.14 3  The Court observed that traditional sixth
amendment groups were generally those who were denied jury service
on a basis other than their abilities under circumstances that gave rise to
an "appearance of unfairness" to them, as would be the case if blacks
were excluded systematically from jury service solely because of their
race. By this exclusion, these groups would be completely denied their
rights as citizens to serve the community in criminal cases. The Court
distinguished these exclusions from exclusion of the sub-group of
Witherspoon excludables at issue, since the latter were disqualified not on
the basis of some immutable trait but rather because of their inability to
follow the law in a particular case. The Court also reasoned that all
Witherspoon excludables, including the "biased yet unbiased" subclass at
issue, can serve in other cases if they can follow the law. Thus, they
suffer no deprivation of their basic rights of citizenship. In this sense,
they are like any other group of persons who possess common attitudi-
nal traits that make them unable to be fair in a particular criminal
case. 1
44
The Court's conclusion also could be justified by the recognition
that there are substantial difficulties in making a common attitude the
basis of membership in a cognizable group for sixth amendment pur-
poses. An attitudinally defined group could be composed of persons
from all economic, religious, racial, sexual and political categories. Its
members would be much more difficult to classify, and the classifica-
tions, once made, would be less accurate. Furthermore, attitudes, unlike
most of the characteristics that define cognizable groups under the sixth
amendment, are subject to change. For example, the number of persons
who are Witherspoon excludables in general has decreased significantly
since 1968,145 but no members of the population have changed race and
few have changed gender. Further, classifications on the basis of atti-
tudes can shift easily during voir dire examination itself. Jurors often
change their attitudes or at least the expression of their attitudes during
the course of a trial or in response to lengthy and intense question-
ing.14 6 Thus, the sharing of an attitude is not a trait that is either fixed
or readily identifiable.
Moreover, the Court observed that when a cognizable group has
been recognized and its members' exclusion held unconstitutional, the
141. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328
U.S. 217 (1946).
142. Duren, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
143. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765-66.
144. Id. at 1764-66.
145. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
146. See D. Crump, supra note 98.
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characteristics that compose the group generally have had no relation-
ship to the performance of a juror's responsibilities. 14 7 For example, a
blanket prohibition against jury service by women or blacks cannot be
defended by any purpose related to those groups' ability to serve. It is
based instead on invidious attribution to the groups of characteristics
shared in widely differing degrees by the individuals within those
groups. By contrast, exclusion of individuals claiming to be "biased but
unbiased," who come from different economic, religious, ethnic, geo-
graphical and political backgrounds, is based upon substantial concern
about their ability to follow the law in determining guilt or innocence.
C. The Relevance of Social Scientists' Findings to Constitutional Adjudication:
The Conviction-Proneness Studies
One of the most controversial issues in McCree concerned the
weight the Court should give the fifteen social scientific studies that Mc-
Cree had presented in the district court. 14 8 These studies suggest that
capital juries from which Witherspoon excludables had been stricken for
cause were conviction-prone. 1 49 Some studies found that, in general,
the remaining jurors were more likely to convict and to view all evidence
more favorably to the prosecution than would Witherspoon exclud-
ables.150 Some studies also concluded that a jury including Witherspoon
excludable members was more likely to be critical of all witnesses and
remember the facts of the case more accurately than a jury from which
these individuals were excluded. 15 1 On their face, the studies seemed
overwhelmingly to support McCree's due process argument.15 2 Yet, the
Court of Appeals split five to four on the issues, and other courts as-
sumed that studies such as those offered by McCree to be valid but con-
cluded that they made no difference.
15 3
1. The Case for McCree: A Uniform Conclusion from Social-
Scientific Research, Consistent with the "Fireside
Induction" and Ensconced in the Comfortable
Status of a Finding of Fact
McCree's case was appealing, in part, because it was straightforward
and simple. All of the studies appeared to point in a single direction:
unified juries in death penalty cases were conviction-prone. The
number of studies and the uniformity of their results enhanced the os-
tensible reliability of this inference. The American Psychological Asso-
147. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
148. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
149. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d 226, 232-36
(8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub noma. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
150. See Zeisel; Wilson; Goldberg; Cowan; Thompson, supra note 58.
151. Cowan, supra note 58.
152. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 238 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lock-
hart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
153. E.g., Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
2258 (1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 578 (5th Cir. 1981), modifiedon other grounds,
671 F.2d 858, cert. denied sub nom. Tison v. Arizona, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
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ciation, as amicus curiae, informed the Court that cross-methodological
consistency was an important factor supporting the acceptance of social
scientific research within the scientific community. 154 These studies,
moreover, were consistent not only across differences in methodology,
but also across a long period of time and with many independent
researchers. 155
There were additional reasons for accepting McCree's arguments.
First, the Supreme Court has used social science in constitutional deci-
sionmaking; in fact, it has done so precisely in the context of due pro-
cess issues in jury formation. 156 In Ballew v. Georgia, for example, the
Court based its holding in part on scientific studies showing that juries
of fewer than six members deliberated less thoroughly. 157 Witherspoon
itself indicated the possible relevance of statistical showings in the na-
ture of those presented by McCree.15 8 Secondly, McCree had obtained
findings of fact supporting his arguments in the lower courts based upon
social scientific literature and testimony as evidence.' 59 Thus, McCree
could invoke the principle that a finding of fact, upheld as against a
"clearly erroneous" attack in a court of appeals, is ordinarily binding on
the Supreme Court.160
Third, the conviction-proneness conclusion was consistent with
what the literature referred to as the "fireside induction."' 16 1 That is,
the conclusion that juries culled of Witherspoon excludables would be
conviction-prone, arguably, was the same inference that an intelligent
nonexpert would draw while sitting by the fireplace, reflecting upon
human experience rather than relying upon statistical data. Finally, Mc-
Cree's argument gained force from the principle that capital cases, if
they differ from other criminal cases, should differ in providing for less
risk of bias against the defendant rather than more.162 The studies used
by McCree seemed to show the deck stacked against the defendant pre-
cisely in those cases in which, if anything, it should be stacked in his
favor. In short, if one accepted the social scientific studies as showing
what McCree persuasively argued they did, it seemed that the only logi-
154. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association at 26-7, Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
155. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
156. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149
(1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
157. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
158. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 520 n.18 (1968).
159. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1287-1308 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
160. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S.
564, 573 (1985); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275
(1949) (The Supreme Court cannot "undertake to review concurrent findings of fact by
two courts below in the absence of a very obvious and exceptional showing of error.")
However, the Court has also indicated that where "constitutional facts" are at issue, it will
review them de novo. See Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366, 368 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436, 442-43 (1970).
161. See MEEHL, LAW AND FIRESIDE INDUCTIONS: SOME REFLECTIONS OF A CLINICAL PSY-
CHOLOGIST, IN LAW, JUSTICE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY (1977).
162. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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cal result was to find Arkansas' unitary jury system unconstitutional in
capital cases.
One need not reject the studies used in McCree, however, to reach
the majority's ultimate conclusion. It is possible for an intelligent non-
expert to accept the fireside induction - that Witherspoon excludables
are more hesitant to convict than other jurors - and still conclude con-
sistently with the majority in McCree that other considerations are para-
mount and dictate a contrary result. The reason lies in the definition of
the legal issue, a matter which social science cannot address. It also lies
in the nature of social science, which presents a paradox: the Justices
are bound in some cases to defer to it, if they are to avoid becoming
anti-scientific troglodytes; and yet in other cases, they cannot defer to it,
because to do so would violate theories of government fundamental to
the system of which the Court is a part.
2. The Simpler Case Against McCree: Definition of the Issue and
Deficiencies in the Experimental Method
a. Defining the Issue: What Excluded Category "Counts?"
McCree's studies were not determinative in the Supreme Court be-
cause, in the first place, most of them did not address the determinative
issue. The relevant question was not whether juries without Witherspoon
excludables were conviction-prone. Most Witherspoon excludables would
be excludable in any event precisely because they could not judge guilt
or innocence fairly. It is easy to see that a jury culled of nullifiers, who
would acquit regardless of the evidence, would certainly be more convic-
tion-prone than a jury including nullifiers; but the comparison is trivial.
The latter jury never would convict, and no one, including McCree, ar-
gued to the Supreme Court that the state must accept such ajury. Thus,
the venire members that counted were those in the elusive "biased but
unbiased" category. The issue, in other words, was whether a venire
that included those particular Witherspoon excludables, who accurately
claimed the ability to decide guilt or innocence uninfluenced by their
bias against capital punishment, would produce a less conviction-prone
jury than a venire from which all Witherspoon excludables had been
removed.
Significantly, most of McCree's studies failed to distinguish Wither-
spoon excludables who also would be biased at the guilt-innocence trial,
or who might tend to vote against guilt to prevent the imposition of
capital punishment.163 Only one of the studies 164 attempted to identify
or account for the likely effect the presence of these Witherspoon exclud-
ables, who were also nullifiers on guilt, would have in determining guilt
or innocence. Thus one way to understand McCree is to view it as a deci-
sion that resulted because the majority of the Court simply was un-
163. For a description of studies and their methodology, see Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d
226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758
(1986).
164. See Cowan, supra note 58.
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willing to give this single experiment controlling constitutional
significance. 1
65
The majority's conclusion also can be defended by reference to the
fireside induction. While it may seem uncontroversial to conclude from
human experience that persons who absolutely refuse to consider capi-
tal punishment would also probably require stronger evidence to con-
vict, the conclusion is less easily reached in the case of the "biased but
unbiased" venire member. This individual's mind, by definition, is ca-
pable of such cold logic that although her revulsion to the death penalty
leads her substantially to exclude considering it, yet, it does not enter
into her decision to find the defendant guilty and thus subject the de-
fendant to the penalty that she finds so revolting. It seems doubtful that
the intelligent non-scientist, sitting by the fireside, would feel confident
in predicting the behavior of this hypothetical venire member as a juror.
In fact, if the "biased but unbiased" individual exists and can be identi-
fied, the possibility also exists that her superhuman capacity for logic,
irrespective of the human consequences, might not make her acquittal-
prone. It might make her conviction-prone in the extreme, with the re-
sult that all of McCree's studies would point in the wrong direction.
Furthermore, when the focus is on these "biased but unbiased" ju-
rors, rather than upon all Witherspoon excludables, definition becomes a
key factor in the measurement. It is difficult to determine how much
"bias" it takes to label a person a Witherspoon excludable in the first
place. After a person is so categorized, it is also unclear how much as-
surance of freedom from bias on guilt is required to place her in the
smaller category of "biased but unbiased" venire members who must be
part of the jury pool for deciding guilt. The size of the disputed cate-
gory of venire members depends upon these judgments, which are diffi-
cult to define and quantify with the precision necessary to support
accurate categorizations, upon which reliable studies could be based. 1
66
The difficulty in defining the excluded category enhances the im-
portance of yet another consideration. Some potential jurors are ex-
cluded from serving upon capital juries because of a bias in favor of the
death penalty. If a capital crime is generally described to them, these
individuals are able to predict the likelihood of their voting for the sen-
tence of death, even in advance of their hearing the evidence. In the
literature, these individuals are characterized as having "automatic
death penalty" bias, or as "ADP's."' 16 7 Presumably, if Witherspoon ex-
cludables who are unbiased on guilt can serve at the guilt-innocence
165. It should be noted, however, that in addition to the Cowan study in Grigsby, two
other studies, Fitzgerald and Precision Research, attempted to account for "biased but
unbiased" jurors in their analyses. Although these two studies were conducted subse-
quent to Witherspoon, they were attitudinal studies only. They did not attempt to determine
the effect "biased but unbiased" jurors would have on a guilt-innocence determination in a
capital case. See Cowan; Fitzgerald; Precision Research, supra note 58.
166. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423-25 n.6 (1985); Schnapper, supra note
119.
167. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1305 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd 758 F.2d
226 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc), revd sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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stage, so can ADP's who are unbiased on guilt.168 The crux of the prob-
lem is that the removal of ADP's may make the jury less conviction-
prone; thus, this phenomenon may cancel or even reverse the effect at-
tributed to removal of Witherspoon excludables. The problem is com-
pounded in that the studies show no consistent measure of ADP's; their
numbers, in the studies, vary considerably. In some studies, ADP's un-
biased on guilt outnumber Witherspoon excludables unbiased on guilt,
although it must be added that the data are not sufficiently reliable to
support such a conclusion.' 69 In other words, the fireside induction -
when properly defined and examined - simply may be erroneous, as
many fireside inductions prove to be.
Finally, fragmentary evidence exists in the form of opinions of ex-
perienced capital trial lawyers. Expert testimony offered by the state
against McCree on this issue, in fact, suggests that capital juries in fact
are not conviction-prone; instead, they may be more acquittal-prone
than other juries, when their real-world behavior is observed.170 If capi-
tal juries do lean toward acquittal, the phenomenon may reflect a
heightened burden of proof imposed by jurors contemplating the death
penalty decision, rather than a balance of Witherspoon excludables or
ADP's. That heightened burden of proof, in turn, is one of the cardinal
advantages claimed by supporters of the unitary jury. McCree's support-
ers, however, vigorously disputed each of these conclusions,171 and it is
impossible to prove or to disprove them from data currently available.
b. Experimental Methodology
The social scientists' findings that McCree offered were not based
upon statistics gathered from actual juror participants in death penalty
cases, because trial courts are reluctant to permit studies of ongoing tri-
als for fear of tainting the results. Instead, most of the studies were
based on interviews or out-of-court simulations. 172 In some of the
surveys, random subjects were asked to rate on a scale their attitudes
toward the death penalty and then asked certain questions about crimi-
nal justice issues. These studies purported to measure the degree to
168. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 616 P.2d 1301, 1346, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128 (1980); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and
Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 54 n.184 (1982).
The court in Hovey estimated that ADP's could be anywhere from less than one per-
cent to as much as 28% of the general population. Hovey, 616 P.2d at 1344. The district
court in McCree concluded that the number of ADP's would be "negligible when compared
to the number of those who would never under any circumstances vote for the death pen-
alty." McCree, 569 F. Supp. at 1308. On the other hand, Dr. Gerald Shure, an expert
witness for the state in McCree, found that 33% of the population he surveyed were ADP's.
Dr. Shure admitted, however, that his figures appeared to him to be unreasonable. Id. at
1307-08.
169. See D. Crump, supra note 98 at 28-30.
170. Record at 1643-45, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). See D. Crump,
supra note 98 at 28-30.
171. See, e.g., Brief for Appellee at 29, 42, McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
172. See supra note 58. Of the studies listed in-this note, only Jurow, Cowan, Thomp-
son, and Haney attempted in any manner to simulate an actual capital case. The remain-
der of the studies were based on participant interviews.
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which subjects were conviction-prone.1 7 3 Other studies asked subjects,
who had been exposed to truncated versions of simulated trials, to
render their own verdicts in such cases on the basis of limited delibera-
tion. Their votes were then compared to determine if there was a rela-
tionship between guilt determinations and the subjects' stated views of
the death penalty. 174 Some of the studies were based on interviews with
actual jurors who had served in non-death penalty felony cases. These
studies tested the correlation between each juror's first ballot vote and
his or her views about the death penalty generally.'
75
The State of Arkansas saw several significant methodological criti-
cisms in these studies.' 76 Few individuals included in the studies were
likely to have experience from which to simulate the "feel" of a capital
case. 177 The severity of the penalty may play a larger restraining role in
the decision of capital cases than do similar restraints in other kinds of
cases. That factor may, for example, account for reports of greater diffi-
culty for the state in obtaining convictions in capital than non-capital
cases. 178 The effect of actual participation in a capital trial is difficult to
measure and even more difficult to recreate in simulated jury trials; it is
impossible to recreate in general interviews.
Indeed, there is reason to conclude that these kinds of "real world"
factors could have influenced the results of the studies. For example,
173. See Bronson I; Bronson II; Harris; Fitzgerald, supra note 58.
174. See Cowan; Jurow, supra note 58.
175. See Zeisel, supra note 58.
176. Brief of Appellant at 41-44, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
177. The study that came the closest to simulating a real capital trial was the Ellsworth
Study which subjected 288 subjects to a two and one-half hour video-tape of a murder
trial. This study has been characterized by at least one court as "an outstanding piece of
research." Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 2, 616 P.2d 1301, 1302, 168 Cal. Rptr.
128, 129 (1980). However, even the Hovey court questioned the data to some degree be-
cause it failed to account for the effect of ADP's. Id.
In addition, the subjects of the study came from a limited area in California and were
described as "suburban upper-middle class" with a "median educational level . . . slightly
less than a baccalaureate degree." Cowan, supra note 58. The cultural attitudes and edu-
cational levels of these subjects would clearly be unrepresentative of actual jurors in a
capital trial. Secondly, WVitherspoon excludables were classified as being unbiased in deter-
mining guilt or innocence on the basis of the following questions asked over the
telephone:
Which of the following expresses what you would do if you were a juror for
the [guilt-innocence] trial [of a capital case]?
(a) I would follow the judge's instructions and decide the question of guilt or
innocence in a fair and impartial manner based on the evidence and the law, or
(b) I would not be fair and impartial in deciding the question of guilt or inno-
cence, knowing that if the person was convicted he or she might get the death
penalty.
By the wording of the questions and the total lack of any attempt to verify the subjects'
responses, it seems very likely that the resulting categorizations are inaccurate. Few peo-
ple, even those with strongly held beliefs against the death penalty, would be likely to
admit they could not be fair or impartial or follow the law in a mock situation.
Additionally, other studies considered in Grigsby fell far short of this attempt to simu-
late an actual capital trial. For example, the Jurow study only provided the participants
with audio records of a simulated murder trial and allowed no deliberations. See also
Thompson; Haney, supra note 58.
178. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
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during the evidentiary hearing in Lockhart v. McCree179 in the district
court, the state presented testimony from Dr. Gerald Shure, a Professor
of Psychology and Sociology at the University of California at Los Ange-
les. Dr. Shure criticized many of McCree's studies because subjects were
categorized as Witherspoon excludables on the basis of only one ques-
tion. 180 Shure's own study, which included a short, simulated voir dire
examination, showed that many subjects reclassified themselves after be-
ing rehabilitated through additional questioning of the kind that would
occur in an actual trial. 18 1 Another state's witness, Dr. Carl Hummel,
testified that unless studies are conducted in a courtroom with real par-
ticipants, where all stages of trial are simulated, including deliberation,
accurate results from simulations are unlikely.
18 2
These kinds of deficiencies have caused courts other than the
Eighth Circuit to remain skeptical about the validity of the social scien-
tific surveys at issue in McCree. 183 The confidence that results from con-
sistency in results across different investigators, methods, and studies is
undermined by the exposure of consistently flawed assumptions across
the same range. Thus, the methodological criticisms may have been
valid considerations in determining the weight the studies should have
been given. The question remains, however, whether the studies should
have been rejected as a basis for demonstrating what they purported to
show.
In McCree, these claims of methodological deficiency received
sharply differing treatments from the dissent, the respondent, the ma-
jority and the state. The dissent in McCree argued that the studies were
determinative of the underlying issue. Justice Marshall concluded that
guilt-innocence juries were balanced in favor of the prosecution.18 4 Mc-
Cree's attorneys and the American Psychological Association strongly
urged that the studies were utterly reliable. 18 5 The majority of the
Court, on the other hand, devoted a considerable part of its opinion to a
discussion of the alleged deficiencies as a basis for expressing skepticism
about the studies' validity.18 6 The State of Arkansas was even more def-
inite in its argument that the studies were entitled to no weight because
they lacked minimal credibility and were "pseudo-scientific."' 18 7
As these differences suggest, the significance of the methodological
criticisms may depend upon the reader's predispositions and may prove
to be the least interesting aspect of the jMcCree decision in the long term.
No sociological study can be designed in such a manner that it is free
from all methodological criticisms. In a pragmatic but imperfect world,
179. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
180. Record at 980-82, 985, 987, 1008, ,11cCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 906, 1009-10, 1230, 1366, 1510.
183. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
184. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1774 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Brief of Appellee at 32-35, .1lcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758; Brief ofAmicus Curiae Ameri-
can Psychological Association at 21-30, .1fcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
186. VcCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-64.
187. Brief of Appellant at 40-48, AlcCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
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experiments are like any other engineering undertaking. The effort to
control all other variables without affecting the one variable under study
can never be completely achieved. Yet, such studies are worth undertak-
ing. They can be a valuable guide to behavior in a proper context. Mar-
keting decisions involving hundreds of millions of dollars are frequently
based upon surveys that are necessarily imperfect.1
88
Sociological studies can even be appropriate bases for legal deci-
sions in the right kind of cases. Thus, the studies on jury deliberation in
Ballew, which addressed the intangible balance between the state's legiti-
mate interests and the values advanced by the petitioner, seem an argua-
bly valid basis for a constitutional decision. 189 An easier case is
presented by the statistical evidence used in adjudication, such as the
showing of invidious discriminatory design on the part of a defendant in
a Title VII case.19 0 The significant methodological flaws and room for
interpretation in studies in many of such cases are counterbalanced by
the need to give controlling significance to the evidence in individual
adjudications if congressional intent underlying laws such as Title VII is
to be honored. Likewise, if the statistics in McCree had addressed the
determinative issue, their deficiencies in methodology should not have
prevented their consideration. It was their failure to ask the correct
question, and, to a greater extent, it was the relationship of that ques-
tion to the ultimate constitutional issue that furnished the most persua-
sive basis for the majority's opinion in McCree.
3. The Better Case Against McCree: Current Sociological Truth
as a Basis for Constitutional Imposition of Theories of
Government in a Federal System
A constitutional question presents a kaleidoscopic inquiry, in which
intangible and immeasurable factors are balanced against other, equally
immeasurable, and often incomparable, factors. Logical or statistical
proofs, on the other hand, result from efforts to narrow and confine the
inquiry. As one author has said, "persistent" errors result from the use
of sociological evidence in court because:
[s]tatisticians do not have to deal with burden of proof, and
hence bury in their use of regression assumptions that a lawyer
would challenge were he or she more keenly aware of them;
and, conversely, that attorneys do not have to deal with the sta-
tistical concept of a "null hypothesis".i...191
Sociological or statistical studies generally must begin with the construc-
tion of a "model," which has the precise purpose of simplifying a com-
188. See Seymour, Numbers Don't Lie-Do They?, 27 Bus. HoRIzoNs 36 (1984);
Zonderman, Forecasts From Teacups?, 30 DATAMATION 28 (1984).
189. Bailew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
190. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(I)(1972)).
191. Campbell, Regression and Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, Comparable




plex and untidy world so that a single variable can be isolated for study.
The model may reflect the investigator's prejudices or preconceptions
and his or her balancing of interests that are not essential to the variable
under study. Furthermore, "it is entirely acceptable within economics,
and other social sciences, to use a model to help explain observed be-
havior when no other model works better, even though in an absolute
sense, the model does not describe the data very well at all."' 192 For
these reasons, statistical evidence is more appropriate for disproving
than for proving hypotheses.
19 3
Thus, even if they are strong and consistent in addressing the nar-
rowly focused issue, one basic problem with enacting propositions de-
rived from statistical proofs into positive constitutional law is that they
do not provide any guide for weighing considerations outside the idio-
syncratic sociological model in question. They may appear to have
"solved" the constitutional dilemma, when in fact all that they have
done is to provide evidence on one of a myriad of considerations that
must be balanced.
In this regard, sociological evidence can be most misleading pre-
cisely when it is at its scientific best. By furnishing ostensibly definite
proof of a lesser interest among the myriad considerations to be
weighed, it may be used to draw the courts' attention away from more
important, but less quantifiable, interests. The Supreme Court has had
occasion to reverse circuit courts for precisely this kind of statistically
induced myopia. For example, in Mayor v. Educational Equality League, the
Court reversed the circuit court's holding that had recognized a prima
facie case based upon sociological and statistical evidence, because it
"did not assign appropriate weight to the constitutional considerations
raised by the Mayor."' 19 4 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, the Court held that the acceptance of statistical and sociological
evidence must be limited in purpose because such evidence did not ad-
dress "the legitimate expectations of non-victim employees," for which
a court must draw on "qualities of ... practicality."
' 19 5
Lockhart v. McCree19 6 presented a similar problem. Indeed, part of
the problem may have been that the argument constructed from Mc-
Cree's studies was simple and appealing. For the reasons set out in pre-
ceding sections of this article, McCree's studies were also subject to
serious methodological criticisms, and they failed to address the rele-
vant question because most of them lumped together all Witherspoon ex-
cludables indiscriminately. However, a more significant problem would
192. Id. at 1303. See also Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410 (5th Cir.
1981) ("[T]he day is long past ... when we proceed with any confidence toward broad
conclusions from crude and incomplete statistics. That everyone who has eaten bread had
died may tell us something about bread, but not very much"); EEOC v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 698 F.2d 633, 656-57 (4th Cir. 1983) (providing a collection of cases involving judi-
cial rejection of statistical conclusions).
193. See Campbell, supra note 190, at 1304.
194. 415 U.S. 605, 615 (1974).
195. 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977).
196. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
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remain even if the studies were accepted as McCree proposed. The sta-
tistical evidence did not show whether the proper conclusion was that
unitary capital juries were conviction-prone, or whether the inclusion of
some Witherspoon excludables who might be nullifiers would be unduly
acquittal-prone. Furthermore, the statistics could not tell the courts
whether the advantages claimed for the unitary jury in fact existed, or
how to weigh them in the balance. Indeed, the majority of the Eighth
Circuit fell into a trap. It failed to give any weight to the disadvantages it
created for convicted capital defendants, who arguably lost the advan-
tages of having sentencing jurors who had wrestled with residual
doubts. It also failed to consider the difficulty of identifying the "biased
but unbiased" juror, the inducement it thereby provided for the aban-
donment ofjuries in favor ofjudge sentencing, and other disadvantages
arguably created by the alternate schemes proposed by the defendant.
There is another, equally fundamental reason for defending the ma-
jority's caution in Lockhart v. McCree.19 7 Sociological studies have
proven to be an inadequate bases for constitutional decision making. In
some cases, even when they have been apparently convincing, studies
have been shown to be inadequate simply because science changes as
does social science. For example, the absence of a deterrence effect in
capital punishment was "demonstrated" by numerous studies prior to
the work of Isaac Erlich. 198 Erlich showed that, in fact, such a deterrent
effect could be computed mathematically from regression models (but
Erlich, a careful sociologist, pointed out that neither deterrence nor
nondeterrence could be "demonstrated" from his study). 19 9 Similarly,
more recent efforts to measure the effect of including the "biased but
unbiased" juror have been more sophisticated, and some of them have
suggested that the earlier research may lead to erroneous conclu-
sions.2 00 Thus, a major problem with the enactment of sociological
proofs and compositive constitutional law, is that the courts would be
required to reverse their interpretations of the Constitution with each
new study that contradicted the basis of an earlier holding.2 0 '
This consideration, indeed, may have furnished a countervailing
consideration to McCree's correct assertion that his argument was based
upon findings of fact. The Supreme Court generally accepts findings of
fact made by district courts, particularly when they have withstood attack
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., BEDAU, THE COURT, THE CONSTITUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 55-57
(1977); SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY, REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 21-22, 34, 63 (1959).
199. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Erlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON.
REV. 397 (1975)).
200. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
201. See O'Brien, The Seduction of the Judiciary: Social Science and the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE
8, 20 (1980) (by judicial use of social science data "the status of constitutional rights may
actually become more uncertain and precarious"); Tanke & Tanke, Getting Off a Slippery
Slope, 34 AM. PSYCH. 1130, 1138 (1979) ("Few persons, social scientist included, would be
content to have fundamental constitutional liberties turn on the results of the latest experi-
mental study.") See also McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
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under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review in the circuit
courts. 20 2 McCree attempted unsuccessfully to invoke this deferential
approach in the Supreme Court. Such an approach, however, would en-
able a single district judge, relying upon changeable sociological evi-
dence, not only to bind the nation but to set quasi-legislative facts in the
concrete of a constitutional holding. As a consequence of this problem,
the Court has repeatedly held that "questions of general importance,"
including "constitutional claims," are not controlled by "resolving con-
flicting testimony."
20 3
A final consideration, and probably the most fundamental, is that
Lockhart v. McCree20 4 was not merely a case in which there was a debate
about conviction proneness; it also was a case about ultimate questions
of federalism. The appropriate balance between the state and the de-
fendant in a capital case, the tolerable level of risk of erroneous convic-
tion, and the weight to be given the arguable advantages of the unitary
jury in the sentencing phase as versus the disadvantages McCree
claimed in the guilt-innocence phase, all are deep philosophical ques-
tions, and they cannot be answered by scientific methods, even if those
measurements help to determine relevant facts. The Eighth Circuit in-
validated a system for capital sentencing that had been in use for many
years. 20 5 No state requires, and none has ever required, the cumber-
some two-jury, replacement, or variable-sized juries that McCree advo-
cated as alternatives. 20 6 Those approaches were certainly not in use
when the fourteenth amendment was adopted. In Marsh v. Chambers, the
"Legislative Chaplain Case," the Supreme Court held that "a practice
[that] has continued without interruption ever since [the earliest] ses-
sion of Congress" did not violate the Constitution. 20 7 Perhaps the same
argument could be made for the unitary jury, which has persisted in cap-
ital cases since a time before the adoption of the amendment under
which it was challenged.
The Supreme Court probably expressed these conclusions best as
follows:
202. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 52(a); Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985).
203. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193 n.3 (1972)(fact findings rejected where "the
dispute between the parties is not so much over the elemental facts as over the constitu-
tional significance to be attached to them"); Derenyi v. Immigration Serv., 385 U.S. 630,
636 (1967) (court is not bound by fact findings "when constitutional claims may depend
on their resolution"); Great At. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 153 (1953).
204. 106 &. Ct. 1758.
205. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1301 (1977) provides that: "Ifa defendant is found guilty of
capital murder, the same jury shall sit again in order to hear additional evidence ... and to
determine sentence in the manner provided by section 1302 .... " This unitary jury sys-
tem has always been the law in Arkansas for capital as well as non-capital crimes. Rector v.
State, 280 Ark. 385, 395, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2370 (1984).
206. See supra note 7 for a listing of the states which currently provide for jury sentenc-
ing in capital cases. In each of these 33 states, the same jury composed of the same mem-
bers either sentences directly or acts in an advisory role. But cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12C: 11-3
(West 1982) (A unitary jury is the rule but a separate jury is available at the sentencing
phase of a capital trial for "good cause" shown).
207. 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983).
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The phrase "finding of fact" may be a summary characteri-
zation of complicated factors of varying significance for judg-
ment .... Findings on so-called ultimate "facts" more clearly
imply the application of standards of law .... Particularly is
this so where a decision here for review cannot escape broadly
social judgments -judgments lying close to opinion regarding
the whole nature of our government and the duties and immu-
nities of citizenship.
2 0 8
As in Baumgartner, Lockhart v. McCree20 9 involved "judgments lying close
to opinion regarding the whole nature of our government and the duties
and immunity of citizenship," rather than discrete fact findings.
It would be inappropriate, however, to attribute these concerns, as
did McCree's attorneys, to a "desire to denigrate all social scientific evi-
dence. ' '2 10 Instead, this reasoning would place the responsibility for
weighing the statistical evidence of the kind at issue in Lockhart v. Mc-
Cree2 1 1 in legislatures. The legislative branch has investigative abilities
that better enable it to evaluate methodological and definitional imper-
fections. The legislature's decisions are not set in the concrete of a con-
stitutional holding, and they can be changed as scientific knowledge
changes without doing violence to stare decisis.
V. CONCLUSION
At one level, and viewed simply, the decision in Lockhart v. McCree
preserves the values of the unitary capital jury. It recognizes the legiti-
mate interests of the states in avoiding the cumbersome alternatives sug-
gested by McCree. In so doing, it allows the states to remove hidden
nullifiers and to preserve a uniform, as opposed to an ad hoc, procedure
for treating their most serious cases of murder. It also avoids the fruit-
less and counterproductive effort that would be required to separateju-
rors simultaneously "biased but unbiased," from other venire members.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the McCree decision protects
procedures that actually may be fairer to capital defendants. It means
that every juror who considers a death sentence will have shared the
salutary community function of grappling with large and small doubts
about guilt before ever reaching that stage. No juror will be able to find
guilt with the assurance that he can pass responsibility for sentencing on
to other jurors. Finally, the decision will remove the inducement to re-
place sentencing juries withjudges. The decision preservesjury respon-
sibility for criminal cases that merit most community judgment.
At another level, the decision vindicates the American system of
government known as federalism. While the sociological evidence of-
fered by McCree was based upon simple and appealing theories, it was
properly subject to criticisms that limited its effect. More to the point, it
208. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 670 (1943).
209. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
210. See Memorandum of Respondent in Response to Petition for Certiorari at 8, Lock-
hart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 103 (1986).
211. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758.
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would have been inappropriate for the Court to enact such studies into
positive constitutional law even if their validity had been clearly estab-
lished. Such studies provided no guidance on the essential question,
which concerned the relative weights to be assigned the competing theo-
ries, interests, and philosophies of government which were at stake.
This question properly belongs before the legislative branch.
In order to accept the Supreme Court's decision, one need not de-
cide that McCree's evidence was unworthy of consideration. Death pen-
alty opponents may still be able to persuade legislatures that their
concerns are appropriate or that one of their suggested models is supe-
rior to the traditional unitary jury. 2 12 Furthermore, their arguments
could prompt a legislative discussion resulting in solutions retaining the
benefits of the unitary jury while addressing the concerns McCree
raised. These arguments and the solutions that might result from them,
however, merit some skepticism. It is likely that their origin lies primar-
ily in their use as vehicles to mount a systematic attack on past sentences
and convictions, not in a campaign to improve procedures for future
trials. If that pessimistic view proves incorrect, and if opponents suc-
cessfully use such arguments to prompt legislatures to create a better
capital jury system, then the fallout from Lockhart v. McCree may continue
to develop for many years to come.
212. In fact, there is an indication that as a result of cases such as McCree and McClesky,
death penalty opponents are refocusing their efforts in an attempt to persuade Congress
to act in some manner to halt executions. These proposals vary considerably. One propo-
sal suggests that Congress pass a non-binding resolution advising states to set a
moritorium on executions until it is "conclusively determined" that capital defendants are
not convicted or sentenced because of racially motivated reasons. Other proposals sug-
gest that Congress should appoint experts to study statistics on race and executions or
pass a law permitting death penalty defendants to use statistical evidence to challenge
their convictions. Hous. CHRON., July 19, 1987, § i, at 21, col. 1.
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